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Abstract
From 1977-2001, 15 US states mandated health insurance providers to oer
coverage for infertility treatment. Although the majority of the past literature
has studied impacts on older women who are likely to seek treatment, this paper
proposes that the mandates may have had a wider impact on the US population.
Specically, it may have given an option for younger women to delay birth since
these policies reduced the opportunity cost of having a child in the future. Results
suggest a signicant delay of 1-2 years in the time of rst birth among highly
educated white women.
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11 Introduction
Currently 6 million women in the United States experience diculties in conceiving a
child even after a year of unprotected intercourse. The gures for the proportion of women
who faced impaired fecundity increased from 8 percent in 1982 to 10 percent in 1995
(Chandra and Stephen, 1998). Whilst various infertility treatment options are available
to assist these couples, they are often extremely costly. Some countries provide nancial
help, but in the U.S. patients often faced the full nancial burden of the treatment.1
Between 1977 and 2001, state-level legislation was introduced in 15 states which mandated
health insurance providers to oer coverage for the fertility treatment cost.
Mosher and Bachrach (1996) suggest that the observed increase in the number of
US women suering from infertility problems is not caused by an increase in the rate of
infertility, but rather due to more women postponing their fertility activities. This delay
of motherhood is prominent among women with higher educational attainment as well as
stronger labor market attachment (Rindfuss, Morgan, and Outt, 1996). One possible
reason for observing the delay particularly among highly educated women is the diculties
they face in balancing work and life. Phipps, Burton, and Lethbridge (2001) document
that, on average, women have more job interruptions than men and 80 percent of these
interruptions are related to motherhood. Since there is a substantial amount of evidence
pointing out possible detrimental impacts of career interruptions on women's future wages
(for example, see Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; Altu g and Miller, 1998; Korenman and
Neumark, 1992), women with high career ambitions may be postponing births to advance
in their workplaces.
If this is the case, the introductions of state-level infertility insurance mandates may
have induced women to further delay giving birth, since the knowledge of accessible
and aordable infertility treatment may have led women to focus on their careers for a
longer period of their lives and postpone giving birth. Given that the majority of women
1For example, the public system in Denmark oers up to three cycles of In Vitro Fertilization treatment
for free.
2who obtain treatment are older and highly educated white women who have stronger
attachment than average to the labor market, such an argument is rather plausible (Bitler
and Schmidt, 2007).
Previous literature on the US infertility insurance mandates has mainly highlighted
the impact of mandates on the take up and the outcomes of treatment among an older
group of women. This is a logical choice of the age group to study as women who need
and thus access the treatment are often those who are above 35. In contrast, this paper
investigates a potentially unintentional impact among younger women. In particular,
this paper studies how the U.S. infertility insurance mandates aected the timing of rst
birth of young women by employing the framework of event history analysis. The impacts
of mandates are identied using the dierence-in-dierences approach by comparing the
timing of births for women residing in states with and without the mandates. The main
data is taken from the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the
Current Population Survey (CPS).
The focus on the timing of rst birth among younger women is appealing, since
understanding how younger women's decisions to have a child alter in response to such
nanicial incentives is an interesting question on its own. Moreover, although these
women having the wider choice of birth timing is welfare improving, the increase in
the age at rst birth is likely to cause various negative health outcomes. For example,
Menken, Trussell, and Larsen (1986) report that delay of birth from the age group 25-29
to 30-34 increases the proportion of infertile women from 9 to 15%. First births at older
ages are also associated with health risks for both the mothers and the new born children
(the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), 2003) . The probability of
down syndrome increases for birth after 30 and the probabilities of miscarriages and
pregnancy complications also increase for older mothers. The delay would, therefore, be
likely to increase the heath care costs due not only to the higher demand for infertility
treatment but also to the more intensive pre and post-natal care required. Lastly, several
of the previous works on this topic use young women as a control group in order to
3investigate the impact of mandates on older women. These papers typically assume
that younger women are unaected by the introduction of the infertility health insurance
mandates. If, however, younger women are indeed delaying birth, the policy impacts
would be overestimated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section looks at back-
ground information regarding the U.S. infertility treatment and the health insurance
system as well as the structure of the state mandates. Section 3 describes the theoretical
framework and 4 looks at the past literature. Section 5 and 6 each describes the iden-
tication strategy and the empirical specication. Section 7 presents the data used for




The initial step taken by couples seeking treatment is the examination of both part-
ners' reproductive organs. As a next step, the majority undergo several less invasive
methods such as the use of fertility drugs which induce women to produce multiple eggs
per ovulation. If the cause of infertility is clear, women proceed straight to surgery in
order, for example, to unblock their fallopian tubes. Whilst most women successfully
conceive a child without using more invasive methods, a small proportion of women pro-
ceed to receive treatment via the Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART), which are
any treatments that handle either sperms and eggs or both. Details of these treatments
are summarized in Table 1.
Although two thirds of couples who seek treatment in the U.S. successfully conceive
children, the success rates vary with the age of women. For example, the pregnancy rates
of ART for women aged 29 is 44.9 percent but this gure drops to 37.6 percent for women
aged 35 (the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005).
4Infertility treatments are often very costly. Hormone therapies which are used to
induce the releasing of an egg could cost between $50 and $5,000 per cycle whilst tubal
surgery would cost between $3,000 and $10,000 (see Table 1). One of the most expensive
treatments, In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) on average costs $12,400 per cycle, although this
treatment only accounts for approximately 5 percent of the U.S. infertility treatment
(ASRM, 2009) . When these treatments are combined or used for repeated cycles, the
nancial burden for patients quickly becomes too heavy for them to continue the infertility
treatment.
2.2 Structure of health insurance in the United States
High medical cost in the US is covered by various forms of health care insurance.
The US health care insurance can be divided into public and private insurance. Public
or federally funded programs are under the control of federal laws and currently cover
approximately 27 percent or 85 million individuals that often face diculties obtaining
private insurance policies (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, Smith, and the Bureau of the Census,
2008). Private insurance, however, is the relevant insurance for the purpose of this paper
as the state-level mandates only aect those that are insured privately.
Private insurance policies are either purchased individually or through employers un-
der group purchasing agreements. Whilst only 12 percent of individuals purchase their
own insurance, the majority obtain their coverage through their employers (DeNavas-Walt
et al., 2008). The importance of employer sponsored insurance in the U.S. is evident from
the sheer number of individuals that are covered by their employers. However, the in-
creasing cost of medical care in the U.S. has also posed signicant nancial diculties
for the employers. As a result, individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance are
likely to be working as full-time employees in large rms (Sullivan, Miller, Feldman, and
Dowd, 1992).
One type of organization which became increasingly important as a cost cutting mea-
sure during the period of interest is the Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). It
5is a type of managed care organization (MCO), which provides health care coverage. In
this system, the care providers charge a low fee for a health care service and in return,
employers who contract with HMOs ensure a steady inow of patients. The introduction
of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 forced employers with more than
25 employees to oer federally certied HMO options as well as traditional indemnity
insurance plans when requested. Although HMOs had only 16% of the market in 1988,
this gure increased to 31% by 1996 (Claxton, Gabel, Gil, Pickreign, Whitmore, Finder,
DiJulio, and Hawkins, 2006). A large proportion of US women have attained their health
insurance coverage through either their or their dependents' employers who in turn have
their insurance packages to be administered by HMOs.
2.3 Infertility insurance mandates
As a way to provide coverage for the cost of infertility treatment, states individually
implemented insurance mandates between 1977 and 2001 (see Table 2 in the appendix).
The extent of coverage varies across the states and these dierences in the generosity
of coverage stem from three main components. Firstly, there are mainly two types of
mandates implemented. \Mandate to cover" regulates insurance companies to cover the
infertility treatment cost regardless of the policy purchased. This is a stronger form of
legislation compared to \Mandate to oer" which requires insurance companies to oer
the option for consumers to purchase the coverage. Secondly, some states cover the cost
of IVF while the others do not. Although IVF is not one of the most commonly used
treatments, it is the most costly option (see Table 1). As a result, the dierential degree
of coverage for IVF by each state creates variations in the generosity of nancial support
given to couples. Lastly, some states implemented the mandates for HMOs whilst others
excluded them from the need to cover the treatment costs. As mentioned in the previous
section, HMOs play an increasingly important role in the US health insurance system.
States with mandates which include HMOs, therefore, would be more likely to have a
larger impact on the timing of birth than those without.
6One thing to note is the lack of age limits in most states. In fact until after 2000, no
states had any imposition of age restrictions. This is slightly surprising as the treatment
success rate is heavily dependent on the age of the woman. Such lack of restriction may
have acted as another factor to encourage women to delay giving birth.
3 Theoretical framework
Heckman and Willis (1976), illustrate a delay of birth when a couple experience a
steeply rising income prole. They use a dynamic fertility model where individuals max-
imize discounted value of utility over her lifetime given a ow budget constraint. They
assume that couples can choose, in any months of the fertile period, the level of contracep-
tion and hence the probability of conception. Under this theoretical framework, they nd
that couples sustain a high level of contraception until their ow of income is suciently
high to conceive a child. Given this theory, women have incentives to delay birth in order
to minimize the loss of wages, and seeing that their income proles would improve due
to hard work during their earlier years provide additional incentive for women to further
delay giving birth.
When women determine when to have a child, however, they have another factor to
consider, namely the biological constraint. Women could postpone giving birth if they
consistently stay fertile. Women's fecundity, however, declines with age. The introduction
of infertility insurance mandates reduced the price of treatment and made it possible
for women to have a child for a longer period of their lives. As a result, the policy
introductions eectively reduced the opportunity cost of having a child in the future.
Although it is likely that not many women possess knowledge of the procedures and the
costs of various infertility treatments in detail before they try to conceive through natural
method, a study by Hewlett (2004) suggest that women are aware of the fact that the
treatment relaxes their fertility constraint to some extent. In fact, she suggests that
they may be over-estimating the eectiveness of infertility treatments as approximately
789 percent of young career driven women believe that infertility treatment enables them
to have a child well into their 40s when in fact the treatment success rate drops sharply
after the age of 35 (the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2003) . Knowing
that infertility treatment could bring them a child together with the knowledge that their
health insurance covers the cost of the treatment in the future, they are presented with
an incentive to delay giving birth.
Although the introduction of mandates reduced the cost of future treatment, the
nancial burden faced by the health insurance providers was likely to have been passed
on to the consumers in the form of either reduced wages if individuals obtained their
insurance through their employers or higher premiums or both. There are no studies
that directly investigated this eect of the infertility insurance mandates on the insurance
premiums. However, several studies used other health insurance mandates to understand
the impact on wages and insurance premiums. Using 1989 cross sectional data, Acs,
Winterbottom, and Zedlewski (1992) note that the health insurance mandates increased
premiums by 4 to 13 percent. Gruber (1994), on the other hand, studies how the state
maternity mandates introduced in three states aected the wages, and concludes that the
full cost of mandates was paid by women aged between 20 and 40.
Such an increase in the premiums reduces the demand for health insurance and thus
the number of individuals aected by the policies are likely to have declined. A change in
wages, on the other hand, generates both income and substitution eects. The reduction
of wages leads women to delay birth due to an income eect. The substitution eect,
however, predicts shortening of birth intervals if childbearing is complementary to leisure.
In summary, aected women are likely to face opposing incentives when determin-
ing their timing of birth and the evaluation of the policy impact requires an empirical
investigation.
84 Literature
The majority of the previous literature has highlighted the impact of the mandates
on older women. This is a natural choice of group as these are the women who are
more likely to seek treatment. In contrast, this chapter sheds light on how the mandates
changed the fertility timing preferences of younger women when they take account of the
availability of cheaper infertility treatments.
The introductions of mandates are thought to have increased the use of various in-
fertility treatments and thus are likely to have aected the birth rate. Using 1985-1999
Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data and the Census Bureau, Schmidt (2005; 2007) looks
at the policy impacts on the rate of rst birth, which is dened as the proportion of
women with particular demographic characteristics giving rst birth. Estimates from
a dierence-in-dierence-in-dierences estimator show that while the mandates did not
signicantly aect all US women, white women who were older than 35 experienced a
signicant increase in the rate of rst birth (approximately 32 percent).
Bundorf, Henne and Baker(2007) study how the mandates aected the access to
and the aggressiveness of ART. Due to the high cost of these treatments, women may
implant multiple embryos per cycle in the hope to increase the success rate and reduce the
number of cycles they need to undergo. However, such action would increase the rate of
multiple births which is taxing both for maternal and fetal health. The reduction in the
cost of treatment may have reduced the level of aggressiveness and multiple birth rates.
Using the 1981-1999 Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data and the 1989-2000 registry data
from the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies, they estimate the policy impact
using a dierence-in-dierences estimator and conclude that the mandates increased the
utilization of ART, however the aggressiveness of the treatment did not change even after
the introduction of the mandates.
Bitler (2008), on the other hand, studies whether the mandates changed the rate of
multiple births and the child health outcomes. She employs the 1981-1999 Birth Certi-
9cate Data and the 2000 Decennial Public Use Microdata Sample and 2001-2002 American
Community Service Data, and nds that the probability of a twin birth increased by 10
to 23 percent. She also studies how the mandates aected various health outcomes of the
newly born children. In particular, she looks at the impacts on birth weight, gestation,
and 5-minute Apgar score for samples of singleton and twin births. Although no eect of
mandates on these birth outcomes are found for young women aged below 30, she nds
some negative impacts on the birth outcomes of the twins and singletons among older
women.
Whilst these past studies have focused on how the mandates aected an older group
of women, it is also possible that these state mandates inuenced women who were
considering a potential use of treatment in the future. In other words, the introduction
of mandates may have encouraged younger women to delay giving birth. If women in
the mandated states were indeed delaying their timing of birth, ndings from Schmidt
(2005; 2007) and Bundorf et al. (2007) not only show increase in the number of rst
births due to more easily accessible treatment but also reects more women at older ages
giving birth because of their planned delay of birth. This interpretation also ts with
the results presented by Bitler (2008). The negative birth outcomes found among older
women may be due to more women giving birth at a later age. This in turn highlights
the importance of studying the timing of birth eect.
Similarly to the present paper, Buckles (2007) investigates whether women delayed
births in response to these policies. Using the 1982-1999 Current Population Survey, she
rst looks at how the rst birth rates of older women aged between 35 and 44 changed
before and after the introduction of mandates using a dierence-in-dierences estimator
and nds that women residing in mandated states increased the rst birth rate by ap-
proximately 40 percent after ve years of coverage. She, however, argues that estimates
may simply be picking up the ability of older women to give birth due to the increasing
availability of infertility treatment over time. In order to identify the cause of the delay,
she then looks at how the birth rates of younger women were aected. The estimates
10suggest that women aged between 22 and 25 as well as 26 and 30 both decreased the birth
rates by approximately 26 percent after ve years of coverage. Bundolf et al. (2007) also
devotes a small section to this issue and presents similar dierence-in-dierences estimates
which indicate that the birth rate of women aged 25-29 decreased while it increased for
women aged 35-39. 2
Although the evidence presented by Buckles (2007) and Bundolf et al. (2007) indi-
cates a potential delaying eect of the mandates, they both assume that the behavior of
the older cohort of women proxies for that of the younger cohort in 10 or 20 years time.
Given that the lifestyles of women changed drastically over the period of observation,
this may be a rather strong assumption. Moreover, the repeated cross sectional data
only allows one to observe the fertility activity until the interview date and thus makes it
dicult to investigate whether these young individuals are delaying births or simply not
having any children at all. As a result, one may obtain an even stronger understanding
of the policy impact by following how the same women responded to the mandates at
dierent points of their lives. This paper, hence, proposes to use the framework of du-
ration analysis using longitudinal data in order to investigate how the mandates aected
the timing of birth.
5 Identication strategies
Special care is needed when studying the timing of birth using longitudinal data.
Firstly, unlike other subjects of economic studies such as unemployment, a woman gives
birth to the rst child only once in her life time. As a result, we fail to observe the timing
of rst birth of the same individual with and without the policy even with the availability
of longitudinal data. Secondly, women's lifestyle and fertility behavior changed drastically
over the sample years.
2There is another work-in-progress research on this topic by Machado and Sanz-de-Galdeano, which
was presented in the 2010 American Society for Health Economists in Cornell University. They also
investigate the impact of the US infertility health insurance mandates on the timing of rst birth using
repeated cross sectional data.
11Taking account of the rst point, it is necessary to compare the inuence of the
mandates on the timing of birth across individuals over time. However, the second point
raises a concern that one cohort of women observed in later years are not comparable to
those from earlier years. Instead, I attempt to identify the policy impact by dening a
comparison group which includes women are residing in the non-mandated states. These
women have similar demographic characteristics to those women who were living in the
mandated states but were unaected by the policies. By comparing the timing of birth
of women in mandated and non-mandated states, the policy impact is uncovered by
evaluating the change in dierences before and after the policy introduction dates. I,
therefore, employ a dierence-in-dierences estimator exploiting the variation in exposure
to cheaper infertility treatment across both states and time.
6 Empirical specications
This paper carries out the analysis using the 1980-1979 PSID. The PSID records birth
month and year of children born to women in the core sample. Due to the grouped nature
of the data and the exibility to incorporate a nonparametric baseline hazard, this paper
employs a discrete-time proportional hazard model. This section follows materials from
Jenkins (2005).
The underlying continuous-time hazard, which is the conditional hazard rate of having
a rst child, for the ith individual at time j is given by
i(jjx;) = (j)exp[xi(j)
0] (1)
(j) is the baseline hazard and xi(j) denotes covariates to control for the ith individ-
ual's characteristics. In this chapter, j is measured in age years, and the discrete nature
of the PSID data implies that a birth is recorded to have been given in the jth age if she
gave birth on the continuous time scale of between (j   1) and j. The discrete hazard
function, thus, characterizes the probability of rst birth by the jth age provided that
12she has not yet given birth by the j   1th age.
hi(jjxi(j)) = P[T = jjT > j   1;xi(j)]
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In order to allow the baseline hazard to be exible, a piece-wise constant specication
is chosen. By tting a period specic indicator variable, the baseline hazard is allowed to
vary across periods. As discussed in Chapter 1, the baseline hazard captures the dieren-
tial hazard rates that are caused by the lengths of childless periods prior to the observed
birth. The vector of parameters (j) captures the baseline hazard. The covariate vector
xi(j) is assumed to be time-invariant within an interval but changes across intervals. xi(j)
contains individual and state-level characteristics, a time-invariant Policy dummy that
picks up states which introduced the infertility insurance mandates. The most important
variable for our analysis is Mandatei(j). It is an indicator variable that equals one if the
individual was residing in a state where the mandate had been introduced for at least
two years. This denition allows individuals two years to respond to the introduction
of mandates.3 To illustrate how this variable is dened, consider a woman who is living
in Connecticut and is included in the sample from year 1985. Since Connecticut intro-
duced its mandate in 1989, Mandatei(j) would be 0 for this individual for the rst seven
years of observation and equals 1 from 1991 onwards. The dummy equals to 1 only from
1991 in order to allow women additional two years to respond to the introduction of the
3Additional analysis allowing for three years of exposure did not change the ndings discussed here.
13mandates. If another woman in the same state is included in the sample from 1989, her
Mandatei(j) would equal to 0 for the rst two periods and 1 in the subsequent periods .
In a usual framework of dierence-in-dierences, this dummy variable is the interaction
between the Policy dummy and another dummy that indicates years after policies are
introduced. The coecient  captures the policy impact which is identied by taking the
dierences in ln[ ln(1   hi(jjxi(j)))] between the two groups of states and evaluating
the change in these dierences before and after the introduction of mandates.
The discrete hazard function specied in Eq. (2) allows the set of covariates, and
importantly the Mandate dummy, to proportionally aect the baseline hazard function.
The shape of the baseline hazard, however, is common between the two groups. Since the
focus of this chapter is to identify how long women delayed their rst birth, an alternative
hazard specication is given by
hi(jjxi(j)) = P[T = jjT > j   1;xi(j)]




= 1   exp[ exp(xi(j)
0 + (j) + Mandatei(j)  (j))]:
(4)
Eq. (4) species exible duration dependence by treatment status. Given the above




(1   hi(k)) (5)
Let ci be an indicator variable that equals one if the spell is censored (i.e. the individ-
ual reaches the end of observation period without having any children). The contribution
of the ith individual to the likelihood function is
14Li = [P(Ti = j)]
1 ci[P(Ti > j)]
ci


























The above analysis does not account for unobserved heterogeneity. However, Lan-
caster(1980) and Van den Berg (2001) point out that uncontrolled unobserved hetero-
geneity would cause spurious negative duration dependence as those with higher hazards
tend to exit rst. By taking account of the unobserved heterogeneity, the discrete hazard
functions with the unobserved heterogeneity are given by
hi(jjxi(j);i) = P[T = jjT > j   1;xi(j);i]




= 1   exp[ exp(xi(j)
0 + Mandatei(j)
0 + (j) + i)]:
(7)
and
hi(jjxi(j);i) = P[T = jjT > j   1;xi(j);i]




= 1   exp[ exp(xi(j)
0 + (j) + Mandatei(j)  (j) + i)]:
(8)
where i is the unobserved heterogeneity.
Assuming that the density function, f(i), follows a gamma distribution, the likeli-
15hood function is marginalised with respect to the unobservables. The choice of a gamma
distribution as the unobserved heterogeneity distribution is rather convenient as all the
relevant functions have closed form solutions. Moreover, Abbring and Van den Berg
(2007) showed that when the unobserved heterogeneity is specied to proportionally af-
fect the hazard, the unobserved heterogeneity distribution converges rapidly to a gamma










(1   hi(k))]f(i)di (9)
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7 Data
The main data used for the analysis is the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal dataset and the data is
collected both at the individual and family level. The number of households surveyed
initially in 1968 was 4,800 but the sample size increased to 7,000 households by 2,000
as the children of initial core sample members left households to establish their own
families. From 1973, interviews were conducted over the phone and computer assisted
phone surveys were introduced from 1993.
While repeated cross-sectional data have attractive features such as the large number
of births and sample size, panel data presents us with several advantages. One major
merit is the ability of longitudinal data to follow the same individuals. This characteristic
is a crucial feature for our analysis for three reasons. Firstly, the main focus of this paper
is to see how women changed their fertility behavior over time. Secondly, identifying
4Another possible approach is to use the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator which ts an
arbitrary distribution of unobserved frailty approximated by a set of mass points and the probability of
a person at each mass point ((Heckman and Singer, 1984)). However, Baker and Melino (2000), through
a Monte Carlo experiment, showed that estimating both exible duration dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity leads to a signicant bias in the parameters of these components. They identify the cause
of this bias to be the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE) to nd too many spurious
mass points.
16the policy impacts requires one to know whether women stayed in a particular state
long enough for the mandates to have had some impacts on their timing of birth. From
the cross sectional data, it is not possible to unveil this information as they only reveal
in which state the individual was residing in at the time of interview. Lastly, fertility
histories of women can reasonably be recovered from earlier waves. This ensures a correct
selection of women, namely those without any children, into the sample.
The main period of observation is chosen to be between 1980 and 1997. As shown in
Figure 2, most states introduced the mandates between mid 1980s and early 1990s. The
period of observation, therefore, allows us to observe how the fertility behavior changed
over years in response to the mandates. The year 1997 is chosen as the end of the
observation period, since the frequency of PSID data collection changed from annually
to every other year after 1997. The reduced frequency of data collection is problematic
for the analysis, since information on the state of residence would be missing for the year
that was not collected.5
Observations are organized in a person-year format. This implies that the same
individual appears in the sample as many years until she either gives birth to her rst
child or she reaches the end of the observation period without giving birth. The width of
the step, a year, is decided in order to impose less parametric structure on the baseline
hazard whilst having enough birth observations. The focus of this paper is to identify
the policy impacts on women's timing of birth, and so a cohort of women who turned
between 20 and 30 anytime during the observation period are included in the sample.
Some women in the PSID moved to dierent states during the observation period.
These women have likely experienced limited inuence from the mandates as their stay
in a mandated state was short. It is, therefore, rather dicult to determine whether they
5Additional regression is estimated using data from 1980 to 2005 for robustness check. Individuals
recorded to have resided in the same state before and after the missing years are assumed to have not
moved across states. Although the conclusion remain the same, the magnitude of the estimates are
smaller when additional years of observations are included. One possible explanation for this nding is
that individuals moved across states during the years when interviews were not carried out. As a result,
the mandated group may have included individuals who did not stay in the mandated state long enough
to be aected, thus diluting the eect. The results are available upon request.
17should be included in the treatment or the control groups as such short stays may or may
not be sucient for individuals to be aected by the mandates. As a result, only women
who did not move are included in the sample.6 After selecting groups of individuals for
the analysis, the number of individuals in the sample became 2685 contributing 10829
observations.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals one if the individual gave rst
birth in a particular year. The demographic variables included are characteristics that
are likely to aect fertility decisions such as women's educational level, ethnicity, age at
the start of the observation period and its squared term. The regional and year dummies
as well as state-level economic characteristics are also included in order to allow for
dierential characteristics across regions and years. These economic characteristics also
control for the level of labour demand during the period of observation.7 8 During the 17
year period being considered in the analysis, female labour force participation increased
and women's lifestyles and preferences drastically changed. Moreover, availability of
infertility treatment increased over years. As a result, individuals from later periods are
more likely to give birth at an older age. In order to control for this dierential fertility
timing over the years, cohort dummies that take account of in which year women entered
the sample are included. Marital status is not controlled in these regressions, since the
status is likely to be jointly determined with fertility.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the PSID sample used in this chapter. The
rst two columns show the average characteristics of women residing in mandated and
non-mandated states separately prior to the introduction of the mandates (i.e. 1970-
1980). The third and fourth columns also show the statistics of the two groups from
6Even when these movers are included, the general conclusion remains the same but the estimated
policy eect is less signicant. Such reduction in the signicance level may be due to the inclusion of
individuals who moved for reasons other than the mandates in the aected group diluting the eect. The
results are available upon request.
7The state-level economic indicators are calculated using the 1980-1997 March Current Population
Survey (CPS). CPS is a repeated cross-sectional survey collecting information from over 50,000 house-
holds.
8The regressions shown in this chapter only include regional level dummies due to the limited number
of observations in some states. However, the results remain unchanged even when additional regressions
are estimated using state xed eect.
181980-1997.
Comparing the statistics, these two groups of women have similar averages in most
variables. However, there are minor dierences in their characteristics. For example,
there seems to be a higher concentration of black women in the non-mandated states
throughout the period of 1970-1997. Moreover, women in mandated states are more
highly educated.
The identication strategy in this chapter requires the exogenous introduction of
the mandates. The employed estimator would eliminate the dierences in the fertility
behavior between the two groups of women as long as they experience the same trend.
If, however, states introduced their policies due to the increasing demand for treatment,
the demographic characteristics, and more importantly, birth trends of the two groups of
women would dier. The violation of this assumption would bias the reported estimates
and they would instead reect both the policy impact as well as dierential trends in
fertility behavior of women.
To investigate if the disparities in the observed average characteristics translates into
dierential birth trends, Figure 1 display the trends of age at rst birth during the pre-
policy period 1970 and 1985 by mandate status and race. These trends are calculated
by using the 1970-1985 NCHS's Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data which collects birth
information via US birth certicates. Although there seem to be constant dierences
between those residing in states with and without mandates for both races, this gure
indicates no disparities in trends between the two groups of women regardless of race.
Additionally, Figure 2 displays various economic characteristics such as top 10% in-
come, median income, unemployment rates and female labour force participation during
the pre-policy period for the treatment and control groups separately. Since highly ed-
ucated women are the primary users of the infertility treatment, dierential trends in
economic characteristics would likely to unveil potential dierence in the demand for
treatment. These trends of economic characteristics are estimated using the 1977-1985
19Current Population Survey (CPS).9 Again, all economic characteristics indicate common
trends between the two groups for all statistics.
Although raw data suggests a common trend among women residing in mandated
and non-mandated states, additional robustness checks are carried out in order to further
ensure comparability of women in these two states in Section 9.
8 Results
8.1 Graphical analysis using the life table survival functions
The life table survival rates are plotted in Figure 3 for women with and without
the exposure to the mandates. Points on these lines Iindicate the proportion of women
remaining childless until a particular age. The left hand side gure shows the estimates
when the entire sample is used while the gure in the middle presents estimates of women
with more than 13 years of education. Moreover, since white women have more access
to health insurance and thus are more likely to be aected by these mandates (Bitler
and Schmidt, 2007), the right hand side gure presents the estimates for highly educated
white women. All of the three gures indicate that women aected by the mandates
remain childless until later stages of their lives. The observed delay seems to be more
pronounced for the group of highly educated white women above the age of 30.
8.2 Regression analysis
Turning to the regression estimates, the discrete-time proportional hazard model with
gamma unobserved heterogeneity discussed in Eq. (2) is estimated and the results are
presented in Table 4. This specication allows for a vertical shift of the baseline hazard
function proportionally to the set of demographic characteristics, but the shape of the
baseline hazard function is unaltered across groups of individuals. The estimates pre-
9The duration of the CPS statistics is shorter as the data only reports the break down of the region
of residences from 1977 onwards.
20sented in Table 4, therefore, show the scaling factor of the baseline hazard function. The
standard errors in the parenthesis are bootstrapped to take account of the state-level
clustering.
The \Mandate" dummy selects a subgroup of women from the aected group. In
particular, it picks out women from the group of aected women who were living in a
state and had already been exposed to the mandates for at least two years. Its coecient,
therefore, measures the policy impact of the mandates. A negative coecient implies a
delay of birth as it indicates a smaller probability of rst birth.
The rst column in Table 4 shows the estimates when the treatment and control groups
are dened as all women in mandated states and non-mandated states respectively.10 The
estimate of the policy impact (i.e. coecient of the \mandate" dummy) from the rst
column is insignicant and positive and shows no impact of the mandates.
Considering that the state-level mandates aected women with private health insur-
ance, highly educated white women are more likely to be exposed to the policies (Bitler
and Schmidt, 2007). Moreover, this group of women may face higher needs to delay birth
in order to balance work and life. Reecting this point, columns (2) to (4) in Table 4
presents the policy impact separately by various levels of educational attainment. Col-
umn (2) shows the estimated impact of women with 10 to 12 years of education. Column
(3), on the other hand, presents results of women who attained 13 years or more edu-
cation. Due to the limitations of the sample size, 13 years of education, which implies
rst year of undergraduate degree, is used as an indicator for selecting highly educated
women. Results suggest dierential impacts of mandates by educational attainment. As
expected, signicant negative policy impact are observed only for the highly educated
women. Women with 10-12 years of education shortened the time until rst birth in-
stead. To see how white women are aected, column (4) in Table 4 presents estimates for
highly educated white women only. Since this is a demographic group that is most likely
to purchase health insurance, we expect to observe stronger impact from these women.
10The estimated coecients of other covariates are given in Table 9.
21As expected, the estimate in the last column is larger when only highly educated white
women are included.11
Estimates in Table 4 merely show how the baseline hazard function is shifted by a
constant scale due to the introduction of the mandates. It is, however, very likely that the
aected women exhibit a dierent baseline hazard over years in response to the mandates.
As a result, Eq. (8) is estimated for highly educated women where the baseline hazard
functions are separately estimated for those who were unaected by the mandates and
those who were exposed to the mandates for at least two years. Table 5 presents the
estimated baseline hazard coecients where the width of a period is a year. Since the
baseline hazard can only be estimated when there are birth observations, some periods are
combined assuming that the hazard rates are constant between the two periods. The rst
column shows (t) for individuals who are unaected by the mandates. The estimates of
interests, however, are shown in the second column. These estimates present dierences
in the baseline hazard rates between the two groups. They suggest that when exposed
to the mandates for at least two years, individuals exhibit lower probabilities of birth
continuously until the 5th period.
To better illustrate how the conditional probability of giving birth to rst child
changed over years, Figure 4 plots the predicted hazard functions. These gures present
white highly educated women's predicted conditional probability of having a rst child.
The left gure illustrates how aected women would exhibit dierential trends if they
were exposed to the mandates for two years by the time they turned 20 conditional on
not having a rst child until this age. Similarly, the middle and right hand side gures
present the trends for women who were aected for two years by the age of 25 and 30
respectively. In all gures, the plotted predicted hazard functions clearly indicate initial
11Due to the small sample size of black women, the results reported in columns (1) to (3) are estimated
assuming that white and black women went through similar experiences and the that dierences between
the two groups stem from the constant racial factor which proportionally aects the baseline hazard. This
may be a rather strong assumption, however, Figure 1 show very similar trends between the white and
black women. Moreover, although not reported in this chapter, additional regressions were estimated by
interacting the policy impact dummy, Mandatei(j 2), with racial characteristics. These results indicate
that highly educated black women are aected in a very similar manner to white women although the
sizes of the impacts are smaller.
22lower conditional probabilities of rst birth among women aected by the policies. The
dierences in the probabilities between the two groups are relatively constant until the
fth year.
The plotted predicted survival functions can be found in Figure 5. Each point on these
lines indicates the probability of remaining childless until a particular age. The thin lines
show these probabilities for women who were unaected by the mandates and the thick
lines indicate those women who were exposed to the policies for at least two years at a
particular age. It now becomes clearer that women who were exposed to the mandates for
two years by the age of 30 exhibit a greater delay of rst birth compared to those who were
20 or 25. For example, when we look at the middle gure, 50% of the unaected women
were still childless at the age of 27 whilst 50% of those who were aected remain childless
until the age of 28.5. On the other hand, we observe approximately a 2 year delay among
women who were aected by the mandates at the age of 30 (from the age of 35 to 37).
Since, less than 50% of women gave birth in the left gure, it is not possible to compare
the years of delay at the median for women who were exposed to the mandates for two
years by the age of 20. However, the gap is narrowing around the median, suggesting a
smaller delay.
Next, Table 6 shows estimated policy impacts by the dierential coverage of the
mandates. As discussed in Section 2.1, each individual state adopted mandates of varying
levels of generosity. If women were aware of the details of the mandates, we would
expect to observe more delay among women residing in states with more generous cost
coverage. The estimates presented here, however, are likely to lack precision due to the
small sample size. There are only 1180 observations of highly educated women and the
analysis using subsamples of theses women exacerbate the small sample size problem
further. This is particularly problematic when estimating the policy impact of weak
mandates as states that introduced weak mandates are typically only 3-5 out the 15
mandated states. Interpretation of these results, therefore, must be done with caution.
Looking at the results in column (1) of Table 6, highly educated women seem to
23respond to \Mandate to cover" more strongly by signicantly delaying rst birth. Since
\Mandate to cover" is a more generous policy compared to \Mandate to oer", this result
matches with the prediction. Column (2), on the other hand, provides results that do
not conform to the theoretical prediction. When the mandates include IVF coverage, the
estimated delay is signicant. However, the size of the delay seems to be larger, albeit
insignicant, when IVF is not covered. In Column(3) the impacts of mandates regulating
all insurance rms are compared to those that exempts some rms. Here again, women
exposed to weaker mandates are responding more strongly by delaying birth.
Although the problem of the limited sample size is clearly evident in the larger stan-
dard errors among the estimated impacts for the weak mandates, further analysis is
required to see if the results reect factors other than the policy introductions.
States that are included in both the \No IVF" and \Not all insurance rms" groups
are New York, Montana and West Virginia. Out of these three states, New York is the
largest and is thus likely to be dominating the results. There are several potential reasons
why women in New York may exhibit signicant delay. One possibility is that women
in New York have more access to fertility clinics compared to women in other states.
However, the annual ART Success Rates Reports published by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention reports that other states such as California and Illinois and Texas
also all have equally many fertility clinics. Another potential explanation is that these
women are inherently dierent from the others and that they would have delayed birth
even in the absence of the mandates. This would be the case, for example, if these women
are more career driven prior to the introduction of the mandates and thus had strong
tendencies to delay birth. If this is true, the estimated policy impacts do not reect the
results of the introduction of the mandates but simply highlight the dierences between
women in New York and the non-mandated states.
To investigate this issue further, regressions excluding New York are run to see the size
of impact New York has on the estimates. In Column (4), IVF covered states excluding
New York are compared to the states which excludes IVF. The size of the estimates are
24now smaller, although the \No IVF" states still seem to suggest a delaying impact. On
the other hand, Column (5) reports estimates of \All insurance rms" versus \Not all
insurance rms" (excluding New York). Again, New York does seem to aect the size of
the estimate, but the \Not all rms" mandate coecient is still negative and signicant.
From these results, New York seems to be one of the factors contributing to the large
negative estimates of the weaker mandates, but is not the only cause.
The results in this section imply that women who were aected by the mandates
exhibit approximately 1-2 years of delay depending on the age at which they were af-
fected. Although plagued by small sample size problem, further analyses on the impact
of mandates by dierential coverage suggest potential dierences other than the mandate
introductions in women who were in the mandated and non-mandated states.
9 Robustness checks
9.1 Analysis on the plausibility of the results
The previous section presented evidence of delay in the timing of birth in response to
the introduction of the state infertility health insurance mandates. This section describes
an additional analysis that is carried out to ensure the robustness of the ndings.
9.1.1 Analysis of the plausibility of the results
The estimated delay from the previous section suggests 1-2 years of delay in the timing
of birth, which seems to be large. To see the plausibility of these results, Figure 6 plots
trends of the average age at rst births for highly educated white women in the non-
mandated and mandated states between 1980-1997. These trends are calculated using
the 1980-1997 NCHS's Vital Statistics Natality Birth Data. To ensure that only states
that are actually aected by the mandates contribute to the average, the mandated states
include states from the year of enactment. For example, New York is included in the non-
mandated group until 1989 and is dened as the mandated state only from 1990, which
25was the year New York enacted its mandate.
These gures indicate that women in both groups of states experienced increases in
the age at rst birth during this period. However, the size of the delay is larger for women
in the mandated states. In particular, whilst women in non-mandated states increased
their age at rst birth by approximately 1.5 years, those women residing in the mandated
states went through an increase of 3.5 years. These raw statistics suggest delaying of
approximately 3 more years among the women in mandated states compared to those
in the non-mandated states. The national statistics, thus, support the estimated delay
reported in the previous section.
9.1.2 Test for the identication assumption
Identication strategy employed in this chapter requires that the infertility insurance
mandates are exogenously introduced. If, instead, these mandates were introduced in
response to greater demands for infertility treatment, the employed identication strategy
would not reveal the policy impact. However, there are two main reasons to believe
that the introduction of the mandates do not directly reect the demand for infertility
treatment.
Firstly, insurance mandates were popular in the US between 1970s and 1990s. In fact,
Jensen and Morrisey (1999) showed that the number of mandates increased by 25 folds
during this period from 35 to 860.12 Jensen and Morrisey (1999) also argued that the
philosophy towards health insurance mandates diered signicantly across states, and a
state with a large number of mandates is more likely to pass new insurance mandates. 13
This fact seems to suggest the state-level preference towards insurance mandates rather
than the demand for infertility treatment as a driving force behind the enactments of the
12One of the policies that could also contribute to the delaying of birth is the mandate to cover for
contraceptive methods. However, such mandates only came in eect from 1998. Maternity leave policies
are also likely to be important when studying the timing of births. The rst paid maternity leave was
introduced in California in 2002. As our analysis only covers up until 1997, the estimated results are
free of the inuences from these policies.
13Lambert and McGuire (1990) also show that the states with many mandates were more likely to
introduce a new mandate for mental health.
26mandates.
Secondly, the lobbying activity for the infertility insurance mandates is mainly carried
out by a non-prot organization, RESOLVE (Fulwider, 2009). RESOLVE actively seeks
coverage for infertility treatment on local, state and national levels. It is founded in 1974
and run by a group of volunteers broadly consisting of both health care professionals and
individuals who have had personal experiences with infertility and/or adoption. Although
there is a concern that RESOLVE's choice of states is driven by the underlying demand for
the infertility treatment within a state, there are several other states, where the lobbying
activities took place but were not fruitful. Examples of these states include Virginia ,
which went through 6 attempts to enact the infertility mandate since 1990 (Audit and
of the Virginia General Assembly, 2008), as well as Florida that holds the second largest
number of infertility clinics in the US (the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2000). Other such states also include Nebraska, Michigan, Maine, Pennsylvania, Arizona,
Maryland, Missouri, Kansas, Michigan and Oklahoma.
The existence of these states with unsuccessful attempts highlights the potential im-
portance of several factors other than the demand for infertility treatment, namely the
opposition forces from the health insurance providers as well as the concerns among the
policymakers regarding the moral ethics involved with the infertility treatment. Indeed,
the two case studies in the state of Illinois and Nevada carried out by Fulwider (2009) re-
veal that the main debates among the policymakers regarding the passing of the infertility
insurance bill involved the potential cost of the mandate towards the health insurance
providers and employers. In addition, some senators raised the issues of moral and ethi-
cal dilemma associated with infertility treatment. These policymarkers argued that ART
procedure resembles that of selective abortion, since it involves selections of eggs for the
purpose of implantation and abortions in the case of multiple pregnancies.
The background information strongly suggests that the infertility mandates were ex-
ogenously introduced. Nonetheless, Table 7 presents results from a placebo test, where
Eq. (7) is estimated using the pre-policy period 1970-1985 PSID data. Looking at a pre-
27introduction period assures similarities in fertility behavior between the aected and not
aected groups and hence ensures the robustness of the identication strategy. Since all
except for West Virginia introduced their mandates after 1985, the period of observation
presents women's fertility behavior in the absence of the policy interventions. Moreover,
by the year 1985, various infertility treatments were already available. The selected pe-
riod, therefore, allows us to see if highly educated women had dierential preferences
towards their birth timings when various treatments could be purchased without the
health insurance coverage. Since West Virginia had already introduced the mandate in
1977, it is excluded from the estimation. The result from column (1) are reassuring with
regard to the exogeneity of the policy introductions as the coecient on the Mandate
dummy is small and statistically insignicant. In addition, Figure 7 plots the predicted
hazard functions by treatment status and clearly indicates that these two groups exhibited
a very similar trend in the absence of mandates.
Although the robustness checks so far seem to indicate no dierences in the timing of
birth between mandated and non-mandated states, estimated results in Section 8 raised a
concern that there may be underlying dierences between women residing in states with
weak mandates and the others. If these women were indeed inherently dierent from the
others, it is likely to observe the dierential birth trends even before the introduction of
the mandates. In order to test this, policy impacts are separately estimated for dierential
coverage. However, even when the policy variables are estimated separately by those
living in \Mandate to cover" and \Mandate to oer", no evidence of dierences prior
to the introductions of mandates are found (column (2)). Moreover, estimated results
are generally small, positive and insignicant and thus does not indicate any dierences
between the states with and without the IVF coverage(column (3)). Additionally, column
(4) presents results for states that regulated all rms to follow the mandated states vs
those that excluded some insurance rms. Again, there are no dierential timing of birth
prior to the introduction of these mandates.
289.1.3 Test for the assumptions in the empirical specication
Individuals who are found to be in the initial period at the age of 20 were likely to
have faced dierent hazard rates compared to those who were aged 25 at the start of
the observation period. In this chapter, it is assumed that such dierences are controlled
for by the inclusion of the initial age variable. In other words, the dierences in the
initial condition are assumed to be reected in the proportional alteration of the baseline
hazard. At the same time, this implies an additional assumption that the dierences in
the initial condition can be controlled for solely by observed characteristics.
In order to test for these assumptions, only individuals who enter the sample at the
age of 20 are included. This makes sure that every woman is found to be in the initial
period under the same condition. However, this reduces the sample size. As a result,
observations with one or two missing years during the sample period are still included,
lling these missing observations as long as their region of residence before and after the
missing years are the same. This is likely to reduce the size of the estimates if women
were moving during these unobserved years for reasons other than the mandates. On the
contrary, this may amplify the size of the estimates if people moved to take advantage of
the mandates.
Although the lack of observations restricts our analysis only to those who were aected
from the age of 20, the results presented in Table 8 conrm the conclusion drawn in
Section 8. Just as the results in Table 5, the coecients in the second column, which
show the dierences in the hazard rate in each period between those who are aected
and unaected, indicate a delay of birth until the 5th period. Moreover, just as before,
the dierences are statistically signicant in periods 2 and 4. Additionally, we now
observe a signicant reduction in the hazard also in the 5th period. Figure 8 presents
the survival functions which are plotted using the estimates from Table 8. This gure
suggests approximately a year delay at the median. The size of the delay is similar to
the result in the main analysis for those who were aected from the age of 20 (see the
left side gure in Figure 5).
2910 Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of the US infertility state mandates on the timing
of rst birth. A discrete-time proportional hazard model is estimated allowing for a
exible nonparametric baseline hazard as well as gamma unobserved heterogeneity.
In contrast to the past literature, which has focused on how these mandates aected
older women, the present paper looks at policy impacts on younger women. In other
words, while women who undergo infertility treatment are generally older, it proposes
the existence of a potential eect on younger cohorts of women who were likely to have
been planning to have a child in the future. Facing the diculties in balancing work
and life, these women may have incorporated the availability of cheap and thus more
accessible infertility treatment into their life cycle plan. If this is the case, we should
observe a delay in the time to rst birth among the aected women.
The results from the discrete-time proportional hazard model indicate an insignicant
eect of the mandates when the entire sample is included and the eect is assumed to
be the same across educational group. However, a signicant negative eect of these
mandates on the timing of rst birth is observed among white women with more than
13 years of education. Moreover, when separate baseline hazard functions are estimated,
evidence suggests that individuals aected by the mandates for at least two years were
delaying birth. Moreover, the size of the delay depended on the age at which these women
became exposed to the mandates. For example, at the median of the survival function,
aected white women are estimated to have delayed their rst birth for 1 year if they
were exposed to the legislation for two years by the the age of 20 or 25. The size of
delay becomes even larger when they were aected at the age of 30. In particular, these
women are observed to have delayed their rst birth for 2 years. The estimated policy
impact translates to approximately 14 percent increase in the number of women who face
infertility. This implies an increase of approximately 0.37 million infertile women.
There are two potential explanations for why we observe stronger impacts among the
30women exposed to the mandates at older ages. Firstly, the older childless women had
already delayed birth possibly for career or educational reasons and thus are likely to be
the sample of women who had a stronger incentives to delay birth in order to balance
work and life. Secondly, the notion of pregnancy and timing of birth is likely to be more
of a serious issue for women who were at the age of 28 than those who were younger.
Results broken down by the level of coverage indicated that women in weaker man-
dated states seem to be responding more strongly by delaying birth. This raises a concern
as it may indicate an underlying cause of the delay observed other than the state-level
infertility health insurance mandates. However, the small sample size, reected in the
large standard errors, raises a concern over the precision of the estimates.
In order to conrm no dierential trends between the aected and unaected groups,
robustness checks were carried out using the pre-policy period (1970-1985) data. If af-
fected women were dierent from the other women, such dierences are likely to be
observed prior to the introduction of the mandates. However, no matter how we di-
vide the sample, we observe no dierences between the two groups of women and thus
indicating the robustness of the delaying eect found in this paper.
Two further assumptions regarding the initial conditions of individuals in the sample
are tested by using only those women who turned 20 at the beginning of the observation
period. Although the smaller sample size only allows us to study the eect among in-
dividuals who were aected for two years by the age of 20, the results from this sample
draws the same conclusion as those in the main analysis.
This paper demonstrate that the introduction of infertility insurance state mandates
not only aected those who are directly targeted, but had a wider policy impact on the
timing of birth. Further research is also needed in order to uncover how the timing of
second birth was aected by these mandates. Due to the delay of rst birth, women may
have had their second child signicantly after the age of 35 further increasing the health
risks for both mothers and children. Moreover, such an analysis would inform us whether
the infertility health insurance mandates aected total fertility rate.
3110.1 Chapter Two: Figures and Tables













1970 1975 1980 1985
Year
Non-mandated states (White) Mandated states (White)
Non-mandated states (Black) Mandated states (Black)
Notes: This figure presents the trends of age at first birth by race and mandates status. Statistics are calculated for the period prior to the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Figure 8: Robustness check: survival functions (White and highly educated women)
 
Notes: Above figure presents the survival functions of white highly educated women when 
only those who turned 20 are included in the sample. The figure compares the survival rates 
of unaffected women and women who were exposed to the mandates for at least two years by 
the age of 18. Points on these lines indicate the probabilities of remaining childless until a 
particular age. The thin lines show these probabilities for women who were unaffected by the 
mandates and the thick lines indicate those women who were exposed to the policies for at 
least two years at a particular age. These probabilities are estimated using the discrete-time 
proportional  hazard  estimates  with  piece-wise  constant  baseline  hazard  and  gamma 
unobserved  heterogeneity.  Data  employed  is  the  1980-1997  Panel  Study  of  Income 
Dynamics. The estimates for the baseline hazard and covariates are included in Table 8 and 
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Not affected Affected
39Table 1: Treatment options, success rates and costs
Treatment  Description  Success rates  Cost  Multiple births 
Fertility Drugs  Regulate reproductive 
hormones and trigger the 
release of more eggs per 
cycle. 
20-60 percent (often 
with IUI) 
Clomipihene:  Minimum 
$50 per cycle 
 
Gonadotropins:$2000-
$5000 including tests, 
drugs and medical check 
ups. 
Yes (8-10 
percent twin rate 
for Clompihene, 
15 percent for 
Gonadotrophin) 
Surgery  Unblocking the fallopian 
tubes or removing 
endometrial scarring, 
fibroids, or ovarian 
cysts. 
40-60 percent (if treated 
for endometriosis and 
scar tissues) 
 
10-90 percent (if treated 
for blocked fallopian 
tubes) 
$3,000- $10,000    
Intrauterine 
insemination (IUI) 
A concentrated dose of 
sperm is injected into the 
uterus or fallopian tubes 
with a catheter. 
5 to 20 percent  $300-$700 ($1,500-$4,000 
including medication and 
ultrasound monitoring). 
Yes if fertility 
drug is also used 
in conjunction to 
this method. 
In vitro fertilisation 
(IVF) 
Eggs removed from the 
ovaries are fertilised 
with sperm in a 
laboratory, and the 
resulting embryos are 
transplanted back to the 
uterus. 
28 and 35 percent  $8,000-$15,000 per cycle  
 
$50000 until success or 
$44,000 and $211,940 







Eggs and sperm are 
harvested and mixed 
together in a lab. The 
mixture is surgically 
injected into the 
fallopian tubes so 
fertilisation can happen 
naturally inside the 
body. 




A single sperm is 
injected into a single egg 
and the resulting embryo 
is transplanted into the 
uterus. 
35 percent  $10,000 - $17,000 per 
cycle 
Yes 
Donor sperm  Donated sperm is used 
during an IUI treatment. 
IVF techniques can also 
be carried out using 
donor sperm. 
 20 to 26 percent (when 
used with IVF) 
$200-$3000 per unit of 
semen 
(Yes, if other 
treatment is  used 
together) 
Egg (or embryo) 
donation 
An egg (or embryo) 
donated by another 
woman is mixed with 
sperm and implanted in 
the recipient’s uterus. 
43 percent (when used 
with IVF) 
$4,000 -$5,000  (Yes. 20-25% 
chance) 
Surrogacy  Another woman carries a 
couple's embryo, or a 
donor embryo, to term. 




Similar to GIFT but the 
doctors make sure the 
egg is fertilized before 
implanting it into the 
womb.  
25 to 30 percent  $8 000 -$15 000  Yes 
Source:Getting Pregnant (2009)  Sperm Donation, last revised 2009, Retrieved August 20, 2009 from 
http://www.wdxcyber.com/sperm_donation.html 
 
BabyCenter (2009) Fertility treatment: Your options at a glance, last revised 2009, Retrieved August 20, 2009 from  
 http://www.babycenter.com/0_fertility-treatment-your-options-at-a-glance_1228997.bc?page=1 






Mandate to  IVF is  Law applies to  Upper 
age 






Arkansas  1987  Y  N  Y  N   N  Y  N   
California  1989  N  Y  N  Y  Y  N  N   
Connecticut  1989  2005 
onwards 
Before 




Hawaii  1987  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  N   
Illinois  1991  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  N   
Louisiana  2001  Y  N  N  Y  Y  N  N   
Maryland  1985  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  N   
Massachusetts  1987  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  N   
Montana  1987  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y   
New York  1990  Y  N  N  Y  N  Y  N  21-44 
(2002~) 
New Jersey  2001  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  N  Below 
46 
Ohio  1991  Y  N  Before 
1997 
1997 
onwards  N  N  Y   
Rhode Island  1989  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  N  25-40 
(2006~) 
Texas  1987  N  Y  Y  N  Y  N  N   
West Virginia  1977  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y   
      Sources: Bitler (2008), Resolve (2008), and The New York Times (2002)  
      Notes: This table presents the states that had implemented the state-level mandates and summarizes the extent of their coverage.  Mandate 
       “to cover” is a type of mandate that requires insurance companies to cover the infertility treatment cost regardless of the insurance policies 
       purchased. On the other hand, mandate “to offer” simply regulates insurance providers to offer infertility insurance policies to customers.    
41Table 3: Summary statistics
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
Age in the first period 21.65 2.90 21.09 3.05 22.47 3.16 21.90 2.71
Birth (1 if birth observed) 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.18
State-level economic indicators
Median annual income 7033.63 1593.85 6229.25 1646.40 14668.93 3806.48 13440.55 3859.00
Top 10 percentile annual income 17621.79 4195.27 16032.85 4106.10 38772.77 9735.18 35580.74 9585.53
Female labor force participation rate 0.46 0.04 0.46 0.05 0.54 0.04 0.54 0.05
Female unemployment rate 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.03
Ethnicity dummies
White 0.92 0.87 0.90 0.88
Black 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.11
Education dummies
Highest grade attended 1-5 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.01
Highest grade attended 6-8 0.001 0.01 0.00 0.01
Highest grade attended 9-12 0.43 0.47 0.30 0.39
Highest grade attended 13 or more 0.56 0.52 0.70 0.59
Region of Residence dummies
New England 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.02
Mid-atlantic 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23
Mid-west 0.27 0.37 0.21 0.26
South Atlantic 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.22
East South 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09
West South 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.03
Mountain 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08
Pacific 0.20 0.05 0.24 0.07
Starting year dummies
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1970/1980 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.34
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1971/1981 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1972/1982 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1973/1983 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1974/1984 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.05
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1975/1985 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1976/1986 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.06
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1977/1987 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1978/1988 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1979/1989 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1980/1990 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1991 0.01 0.04
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1992 0.02 0.03
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1993 0.02 0.03
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1994 0.02 0.02
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1995 0.01 0.02
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1996 0.01 0.01
1 if the observation enters in the sample in 1997 0.01 0.01
Year dummies
1 if observed in 1970/1980 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05
1 if observed in 1971/1981 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05
1 if observed in 1972/1982 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00
1 if observed in 1973/1983 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05
1 if observed in 1974/1984 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05
1 if observed in 1975/1985 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.06
1 if observed in 1976/1986 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1977/1987 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1978/1988 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.05
1 if observed in 1979/1989 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1980/1990 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.06
1 if observed in 1991 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1992 0.06 0.06
1 if observed in 1993 0.07 0.07
1 if observed in 1994 0.07 0.07
1 if observed in 1995 0.05 0.06
1 if observed in 1996 0.06 0.07
1 if observed in 1997 0.04 0.05
Number of observations 2103 3552 3997 6832
Number of individuals 586 1015 1001 1684
Note: This table reports the averages and standard deviations of variables taking account of the survey data structure of PSID. Treatment group includes women who were
residing in states that introduced mandates sometime during the observation period. The first two columns report the summary statistics of variables from the pre-policy





42Table 4: Estimates of mandates eect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Women
10≤Education≤12
All race All race All race
Mandate (Policy×After) 0.03 0.30* -0.38** -0.54**
(0.12) (0.17) (0.17)
Policy 0.14 0.12 0.16
(0.42) (0.33) (0.46)
LR test of gamma variance 12.40*** 2.28* 1.60
Number of women observed 2685 1339 1180
Observations 10829 4794 4925
Notes: This table displays key policy impact variables from discrete-time proportional hazard estimates with 
heterogeneity. Data employed is the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The dependent variable is
a dummy which equals one if birth observed  in a piece-wise constant baseline hazard and  gamma unobserved  
particular year and 0 otherwise. The estimates for the baseline hazard and covariates are included in Table 9
in the appendix. Covariates included are: age of individuals in the first year of observation and its squared 
term, race, education and region of residence dummies, state-level characteristics,  year fixed effects and start 
year dummies. The flexible baseline hazard is assumed to be common between the treatment and control groups. 
Column (1) shows  regression results when all women in the sample are included.
Column (2) shows results estimated using a sample of women with 10 to 12 years of education. 
Column (3) shows results for women with more than 13 years of education  
Column (4) shows results for white women with more than 13 years of education.
Standard errors are bootstrapped  to take account of state-level clustering and are shown in parenthesis. 










43Table 5: Estimated baseline hazard
 Periods (t) Coefficients  Periods(t) Coefficients
Mandate_period1 -0.58
(0.46)
period2 0.06 Mandate_period2 -0.55***
(0.13) (0.20)
period3 0.32* Mandate_period3 -0.42
(0.18) (0.36)
period4 0.40* Mandate_period4 -0.87***
(0.23) (0.31)
period5 0.55* Mandate_period5 -0.73
(0.30) (0.48)
period6/7 0.25 Mandate_period6/7 0.14
(0.33) (0.27)
period8/9 0.27 Mandate_period8/9 0.19
(0.44) (0.39)
period10/11 0.20 Mandate_period10/11 -0.07
(0.57) (0.23)
period12/15 -0.16 Mandate_period12/15 -0.02
(0.63) (0.37)
Notes: This table displays the baseline hazard estimates from discrete-time proportional
hazard model with piece-wise constant baseline hazard and gamma unobserved
heterogeneity. The first column shows the piece-wise constant baseline hazard for the
unaffected individuals whereas the second column includes the difference in hazard between
the affected and unaffected individuals. Number of individuals in the sample is 1180
contributing binary responses of 4925. LR test of gamma variance reports a chi squared
statistics of 1.713*. Data employed is the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The
dependent variable is a dummy which equals one if birth observed and 0 otherwise. The
estimates for the covariates are included in Table 9 in the appendix. Standard errors are
bootstrapped to take account of the state-level clustering and are reported in parentheses.
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ***
44Table 6: Policy impacts by dierential coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cover vs Offer IVF vs no IVF
All firms vs Not 
all firms
IVF vs no IVF 
(excluding New 
York)











Mandate_IVF covered -0.18* -0.18*
(0.11) (0.11)
Mandate_IVF not covered -0.71 -0.35
(0.44) (0.29)
Policy_IVF covered -0.01 -0.02
(0.50) (0.17)
Policy_IVF not covered 0.47 0.22
(0.68) (0.28)
Mandate_All insurance firms -0.13 -0.12
(0.15) (0.12)
Mandate_Not all insurance firms -1.01** -0.67**
(0.40) (0.31)
Policy_All insurance firms 0.09 0.04
(0.44) (0.20)
Policy_Not all insurance firms 0.31 0.01
(0.62) (0.32)
LR test of gamma variance 3.60** 1.53 3.55** 1.34 2.51*
Number of women observed 1180 1180 1180 1110 1110
Observations 4925 4925 4925 4635 4635
Notes: This table displays key policy impact variables estimated separately by the characteristics of the mandate. 
These results were estimated using the dicrete-time proportional hazard model with piece-wise constant baseline hazard
 and gamma unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is a dummy which equals to one if birth observed 0 otherwise.  
The estimates for theh baseline hazard and covariates are included in the appendix (Table 9)


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46Table 8: Test for the assumptions regarding the sampling scheme
 Periods (t) Coefficients  Periods(t) Coefficients
Mandate_period1 -0.51
(0.507)
period2 -0.27 Mandate_period2 -0.99***
(0.180) (0.343)
period3 0.13 Mandate_period3 0.15
(0.181) (0.254)
period4 0.53** Mandate_period4 -0.66*
(0.245) (0.399)
period5 1.15*** Mandate_period5 -1.15***
(0.245) (0.402)
period6/7 1.42*** Mandate_period6/7 -0.17
(0.314) (0.268)
period8/9 1.98*** Mandate_period8/9 0.11
(0.449) (0.340)
period10/11 2.48*** Mandate_period10/11 0.73**
(0.644) (0.306)
period12/15 2.97*** Mandate_period12/15 -0.14
(0.794) (0.413)
Notes: This table shows results estimated by using a sample of women who were 20 in the
initial period. The first column shows the piece-wise constant baseline hazard for the
unaffected individuals whereas the second column includes the difference in hazard between
the affected and unaffected individuals. LR test of gamma variance reports a chi squared
statistics of 10.82***. Data employed is the 1980-1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
The dependent variable is a dummy which equals one if birth observed and 0 otherwise. The
estimates for the baseline hazard and covariates are included in Table 9 in the appendix.
Number of individuals in the sample is 1101 contributing binary responses of 4125.
Standard errors are bootstrapped to take account of the state-level clustering and are
reported in parentheses. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 ***
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5111 Appendix
Table 9: All estimates (Tables 4-6)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Period
   Period 2 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.28** 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.12
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.10)
   Period 3 0.23 -0.01 0.36* 0.94*** 0.45** 0.33* 0.43** 0.32 0.39**
(0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.18)
   Period 4 0.38 0.19 0.38 1.08*** 0.51* 0.35 0.49* 0.31 0.42
(0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.32) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31)
   Period 5 0.43 0.01 0.55 1.71*** 0.72** 0.50 0.69** 0.50 0.64**
(0.30) (0.29) (0.39) (0.43) (0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.35) (0.30)
   Period 6 0.44 0.22 0.18 1.37*** 0.39 0.13 0.36 0.12 0.30
(0.35) (0.38) (0.44) (0.50) (0.38) (0.36) (0.37) (0.43) (0.45)
   Period 7 0.71* 0.31 0.70 1.52*** 0.94** 0.65 0.90** 0.65 0.84
(0.40) (0.48) (0.50) (0.57) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41) (0.46) (0.54)
   Period 8 0.75 0.49 0.42 1.64** 0.69 0.37 0.67 0.39 0.62
(0.48) (0.49) (0.61) (0.66) (0.54) (0.53) (0.50) (0.52) (0.60)
   Period 9 0.76 0.27 0.57 2.15*** 0.87 0.51 0.85 0.54 0.80
(0.55) (0.63) (0.65) (0.71) (0.57) (0.54) (0.54) (0.57) (0.49)
   Period 10 0.90 0.47 0.63 2.02** 0.94 0.56 0.92 0.47 0.74
(0.58) (0.59) (0.80) (0.85) (0.71) (0.66) (0.68) (0.61) (0.63)
   Period 11 0.84 0.62 -0.02 1.47* 0.33 -0.09 0.32 -0.04 0.27
(0.68) (0.69) (0.86) (0.83) (0.79) (0.74) (0.75) (0.71) (0.70)
   Period 12 0.91 0.71 0.09 1.79** 0.45 0.02 0.42 0.07 0.38
(0.74) (0.86) (0.96) (0.85) (0.85) (0.75) (0.79) (0.74) (0.70)
   Period 13 1.21 0.30 0.72 2.71*** 1.11 0.64 1.09 0.54 0.89
(0.73) (0.88) (0.89) (0.90) (0.75) (0.69) (0.70) (0.73) (0.74)
   Period 14 -1.57** -1.54 -1.13 -1.62** -1.16 -1.63 -1.27
(0.78) (1.03) (0.85) (0.82) (3.44) (1.20) (0.85)
   Period 15 0.63 -0.22 0.19 -0.30 0.18 -0.28 0.10
(0.87) (1.14) (1.00) (3.17) (0.96) (0.97) (1.09)
   Period 17 -0.00
(0.94)
   Period 18
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (1). Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (2)
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (2). Column (8): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (3).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (3). Column (9): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (4).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (4). Column (10): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (5).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.5.
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (1).
52VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Education dummies
   Highest grade attended 6-8 3.46
(4.44)
   Highest grade attended 9-12 3.26
(4.40)
   Highest grade attended 13 or more 2.84
(4.41)
Ethnicity dummies
   White -0.16 0.05 -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.46*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.50** -0.49***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13)
Age in the first year of observation 1.68*** 1.45*** 1.88*** 2.26*** 1.89*** 1.94*** 1.88*** 1.92*** 1.92*** 1.87***
(0.16) (0.27) (0.22) (0.27) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.21) (0.32)
Age in the first year of observation squared -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Region of Residence dummies
   Mid-atlantic  0.17 0.19 0.03 -0.23 0.04 0.01 -0.13 0.08 -0.15 -0.17
(0.58) (2.43) (0.64) (0.69) (0.65) (0.66) (0.71) (0.69) (0.89) (0.31)
   Mid-west  0.20 0.17 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.07
(0.40) (2.33) (0.54) (0.55) (0.52) (0.57) (0.58) (0.60) (0.33) (0.23)
   South Atlantic 0.19 0.17 -0.01 -0.26 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.10
(0.48) (2.37) (0.60) (0.60) (0.57) (0.50) (0.68) (0.61) (0.57) (0.24)
   East South 0.34 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.03
(0.61) (2.28) (0.71) (0.84) (0.71) (0.71) (0.80) (0.74) (0.76) (0.31)
   West South 0.29 0.32 0.03 0.35 -0.00 -0.12 -0.04 0.10 0.06 -0.03
(0.52) (2.32) (0.61) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66) (0.70) (0.68) (0.81) (0.27)
   Mountain 0.60 0.38 0.49 0.77 0.46 0.52 0.37 0.55 0.49 0.38
(0.60) (2.38) (0.73) (0.70) (0.68) (0.72) (0.75) (0.77) (0.61) (0.33)
   Pacific 0.14 -0.15 0.12 0.06 0.11 -0.08 -0.13 0.17 0.14 -0.03
(0.76) (2.30) (0.69) (0.76) (0.68) (0.82) (0.86) (0.77) (0.94) (0.32)
State-level Economics Indicators
   Median annual income  -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
   Top 10 percentile annual income  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
   Female labor force participation rate  0.62 2.24 0.26 -2.92 0.36 -0.30 0.29 0.08 0.21 0.78
(2.73) (2.74) (2.99) (3.80) (2.90) (3.01) (3.19) (2.96) (3.10) (1.67)
   Female unemployment rate  3.82 3.87 5.77** 11.33*** 6.01** 6.21** 6.14*** 5.53** 5.84* 6.19**
(2.47) (3.39) (2.50) (3.46) (2.56) (2.48) (2.34) (2.35) (3.07) (2.73)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (1). Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (2)
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (2). Column (8): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (3).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (3). Column (9): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (4).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (4). Column (10): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (5).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.5.
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (1).
53VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Starting year dummies
   start81 0.49*** 0.57*** 0.42** 0.03 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.63* 0.49**
(0.15) (0.19) (0.16) (0.24) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.33) (0.22)
   start82 0.68*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.89*** 0.62*** 0.71*** 0.65*** 0.72*** 0.37 0.68**
(0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.29) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.32) (0.27)
   start83 0.65*** 0.57** 0.61*** 0.80** 0.57*** 0.67*** 0.59*** 0.65*** 0.30 0.59**
(0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.36) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.30) (0.30)
   start84 0.72*** 0.85*** 0.61** 0.40 0.55** 0.69*** 0.59** 0.69*** 0.33 0.56*
(0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.41) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (0.30)
   start85 0.39 0.17 0.67* 0.62 0.56** 0.73*** 0.66** 0.72*** -0.52 0.80***
(0.30) (0.34) (0.37) (0.39) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.25) (0.40) (0.29)
   start86 0.66* 0.25 1.15*** 1.58*** 1.04*** 1.28*** 1.17*** 1.27*** -0.22 1.09***
(0.35) (0.39) (0.38) (0.48) (0.24) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.35) (0.32)
   start87 0.49 0.52 0.31 0.19 0.24 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.34 0.40
(0.41) (0.47) (0.49) (0.53) (0.34) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.31)
   start88 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.17 0.57 0.77* 0.68 0.80* -0.00 0.63*
(0.48) (0.47) (0.54) (0.51) (0.37) (0.43) (0.44) (0.41) (0.42) (0.33)
   start89 0.69 0.90 0.49 0.54 0.47 0.61 0.52 0.62 0.12 0.56*
(0.48) (0.57) (0.60) (0.58) (0.36) (0.44) (0.43) (0.40) (0.47) (0.31)
   start90 1.38** 1.40** 0.96 1.16** 0.95** 1.13** 0.95* 1.16** 0.09 0.98***
(0.60) (0.62) (0.66) (0.58) (0.44) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.52) (0.34)
   start91 0.83 1.18* 0.58 0.25 0.63 0.71 0.59 0.70 -0.25 0.55
(0.58) (0.61) (0.66) (0.68) (0.44) (0.49) (0.45) (0.46) (0.57) (0.35)
   start92 1.15* 1.03 1.00 1.15 1.04** 1.19** 1.03** 1.24** -0.31 1.07***
(0.64) (0.65) (0.74) (0.73) (0.44) (0.54) (0.52) (0.48) (0.60) (0.38)
   start93 0.88 1.42** 0.59 0.28 0.69 0.75 0.62 0.79 -0.12 0.61*
(0.71) (0.72) (0.81) (0.78) (0.48) (0.58) (0.58) (0.52) (0.64) (0.34)
   start94 0.52 0.90 -0.05 -0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.12 -0.70 -0.03
(0.81) (0.79) (0.87) (0.79) (0.55) (0.62) (0.62) (0.56) (0.72) (0.39)
   start95 0.85 1.18 0.51 0.37 0.63 0.70 0.56 0.75 -0.16 0.55
(0.80) (0.78) (0.99) (0.94) (0.59) (0.74) (0.74) (0.67) (0.75) (0.42)
   start96 0.52 0.53 0.27 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.33 0.43 0.26
(0.86) (0.85) (1.03) (0.93) (0.57) (0.75) (0.69) (0.67) (0.48)
   start97 0.22 0.59 -0.37 -1.23
(0.95) (0.87) (1.08) (3.58)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.5.
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (1).
Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (2)
Column (8): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (3).
Column (9): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (4).
Column (10): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (5).
54VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Year fixed effects
   year1981 -0.10 -0.03 -0.31* -0.13 -0.30* -0.30** -0.30* -0.30* -0.30 -0.31*
(0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17)
   year1982 -0.16 -0.10 -0.40* -0.81*** -0.37* -0.41** -0.39** -0.39* -0.45* -0.45***
(0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.26) (0.14)
   year1983 -0.01 0.16 -0.37* -0.74*** -0.37* -0.39** -0.37* -0.37* -0.36 -0.36*
(0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.27) (0.21)
   year1984 -0.10 0.16 -0.56** -0.89*** -0.54** -0.57*** -0.54** -0.57** -0.50* -0.52**
(0.16) (0.18) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) (0.21)
   year1985 -0.04 0.26 -0.54*** -1.03*** -0.52** -0.56*** -0.52*** -0.56*** -0.45 -0.47*
(0.18) (0.25) (0.21) (0.32) (0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) (0.25)
   year1986 0.28* 0.55*** -0.39 -0.72* -0.19 -0.41* -0.36 -0.41* -0.60** -0.63
(0.16) (0.16) (0.25) (0.40) (0.27) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24) (0.28) (0.41)
   year1987 0.35*** 0.63*** -0.24 -0.42** -0.11 -0.26* -0.22 -0.27 -0.22 -0.26
(0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.26)
   year1988 0.46*** 0.68*** 0.07 -0.29 0.23 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.06
(0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.28) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.24) (0.29)
   year1989 0.48*** 0.58*** 0.24* 0.04 0.40*** 0.23* 0.23* 0.18 0.21 0.18
(0.07) (0.21) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.23) (0.21)
   year1991 0.32*** 0.37** 0.15 -0.06 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.06
(0.09) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) (0.24)
   year1992 0.35*** 0.32** 0.01 -0.28* 0.11 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12
(0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.24) (0.23)
   year1993 0.18* 0.11 0.08 -0.38* 0.23* 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.03
(0.10) (0.20) (0.14) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.22) (0.19)
   year1994 0.39*** 0.29 0.34*** 0.22* 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.31 0.29*
(0.10) (0.21) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.15)
   year1995 0.01 0.25 -0.40*** -0.51*** -0.38** -0.39** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.47* -0.48**
(0.10) (0.21) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.25) (0.19)
   year1996 0.19* 0.11 0.21 -0.03 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.13
(0.11) (0.23) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.25)
Constant -26.56*** -20.81*** -25.86*** -30.67*** -25.91*** -26.35*** -25.77*** -26.25***  -25.84*** -26.15***
(4.59) (3.69) (2.78) (4.01) (3.24) (2.94) (3.05) (3.21) (0.93) (3.60)
LR test of gamma variance 12.40*** 1.60 2.276* 15.30*** 1.713* 3.60** 1.53 3.55** 1.34 0.59
Observations 10829 4794 4925 4925 4925 4925 4925 4925 4635 4635
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.4, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.5.
Column (6): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (1).
Column (7): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (2)
Column (8): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (3).
Column (9): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (4).
Column (10): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.6, column (5).
55Table 10: All estimates (Tables 7 and 8)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Period
   Period 2 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.09
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
   Period 3 0.43* 0.37 0.40* 0.66***
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21)
   Period 4 0.43 0.34 0.38 0.77***
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.28)
   Period 5 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.62*
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.35)
   Period 6 0.52 0.38 0.45 1.07***
(0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.40)
   Period 7 0.44 0.27 0.35 1.08**
(0.56) (0.56) (0.57) (0.48)
   Period 8 0.35 0.15 0.24 1.08**
(0.65) (0.64) (0.65) (0.55)
   Period 9 0.00 -0.21 -0.12 0.86
(0.76) (0.75) (0.76) (0.64)
   Period 10 0.40 0.16 0.26 1.34**
(0.82) (0.81) (0.82) (0.68)
   Period 11 -1.93 -2.19* -2.10 -0.89
(1.31) (1.31) (1.32) (1.21)
   Period 12 -0.67 -0.94 -0.84 0.45
(1.07) (1.06) (1.08) (0.93)
   Period 13 -1.64 -1.92 -1.83 -0.45
(1.38) (1.37) (1.39) (1.27)
   Period 14 -1.52 -1.81 -1.71 -0.28
(1.41) (1.40) (1.42) (1.29)
   Period 15 -1.35 -1.67 -1.55 -0.06
(1.44) (1.43) (1.44) (1.31)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.8. 56VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Ethnicity dummies
   White -0.39** -0.37** -0.38** -0.53*** -0.99***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.261)
Age in the first year of observation 2.41*** 2.32*** 2.37*** 2.68***
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Age in the first year of observation squared -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Region of Residence dummies
   Mid-atlantic  0.10 0.12 -0.05 0.09 -0.19
(0.34) (0.33) (0.38) (0.38) (0.935)
   Mid-west  0.20 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.28
(0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.34) (0.822)
   South Atlantic -0.16 -0.17 -0.24 -0.15 0.32
(0.32) (0.31) (0.33) (0.36) (0.874)
   East South 0.54 0.56 0.46 0.55 0.90
(0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.45) (1.027)
   West South 0.63* 0.74** 0.60* 0.69* 1.11
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.39) (0.996)
   Mountain 0.76* 0.74* 0.67 0.87* 0.60
(0.42) (0.41) (0.43) (0.46) (0.873)
   Pacific 0.25 0.42 0.04 0.37 0.55
(0.32) (0.35) (0.40) (0.36) (1.019)
State-level Economics Indicators
   Median annual income  -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00* -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000)
   Top 10 percentile annual income  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000)
   Female labor force participation rate  2.24 2.80 2.25 2.61 0.03
(2.10) (2.10) (2.09) (2.29) (2.211)
   Female unemployment rate  1.35 1.06 1.54 0.84 4.51
(2.65) (2.63) (2.65) (2.75) (3.413)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.8.
57VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Starting year dummies
start71 0.60* 0.59* 0.59* 0.65*    start81 -0.56**
(0.32) (0.30) (0.31) (0.37) (0.252)
start72 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.37    start82 -0.16
(0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.35) (0.353)
start73 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25    start83 -0.31
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.33) (0.411)
start74 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.27    start84 -0.47
(0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.33) (0.317)
start75 -0.67* -0.67* -0.68* -0.63    start85 -0.72*
(0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.43) (0.426)
start76 -0.45 -0.48 -0.47 -0.32    start86 0.09
(0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.38) (0.380)
start77 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.21    start87 -0.90**
(0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41) (0.389)
start78 -0.43 -0.49 -0.48 -0.13    start88 -1.04**
(0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.465)
start79 -0.33 -0.41 -0.40 0.02    start89 -0.50
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.475)
start80 -0.34 -0.43 -0.41 0.03    start90 -0.87*
(0.54) (0.53) (0.54) (0.51) (0.476)
start81 -0.75 -0.79 -0.83 -0.39    start91 -0.15
(0.59) (0.58) (0.59) (0.57) (0.536)
start82 -0.76 -0.82 -0.85 -0.35    start92_94 -0.24
(0.62) (0.61) (0.62) (0.59) (0.590)
start83 -0.57 -0.65 -0.67 -0.12    start95_97 -0.46
(0.67) (0.65) (0.67) (0.63) (0.709)
start84 -1.23* -1.30* -1.34* -0.73
(0.74) (0.72) (0.74) (0.69)
start85 -0.67 -0.78 -0.78 -0.15
(0.77) (0.75) (0.77) (0.72)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.8.
58VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
Year fixed effects
   year1981 -0.01
(0.344)
   year1982 0.29
(0.358)
   year1983 -0.10
(0.472)
   year1984 -0.17
(0.416)
   year1985 -0.05
(0.423)
   year1986 0.11
(0.371)
   year1987 0.04
(0.260)
   year1988 0.30
(0.309)
   year1989 0.49*
(0.251)
   year1990 0.39
(0.280)
   year1991 0.16
(0.231)
   year1992 0.30
(0.185)
   year1993 0.54***
(0.185)
   year1994 -0.18
(0.166)
   year1995 0.48***
(0.155)
Constant -32.21*** -31.30*** -31.69*** -35.38*** -3.17*
(5.87) (5.90) (5.89) (5.95) (1.703)
LR test of gamma variance 47.01*** 46.18*** 46.51*** 55.68*** 10.82***
Observations 4257 4257 4257 4257 4125
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:
-This table includes estimates that were not included in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 .
Column (1): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (1).
Column (2): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (2).
Column (3): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 ,column (3).
Column (4): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.7, column (4).
Column (5): Coefficient estimates from Table 2.8.
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